Protests = Democracy?

Events in Iran this week have been pretty riveting, true, but let's keep things in perspective: protests are neither equivalent to democracy nor do they automatically lead a country to democracy.

The American media has been breathless in reporting on the newfound power of the people in Tehran, and apostles of the new "social" media see this as sort of the tech version of the Rapture. On NPR this morning, one of the Americans who is commendably allowing Iranians to use his computer as a proxy server to send messages on Twitter averred that this is a turning point in the history of technology and democracy.

It is?

First, on a superficial note, the fact that allegedly doctored photos zip around the Internet doesn't herald a new era of media. Did we really need social media to tell us that Iran is a repressive country?

Second, on a deeper level, this raises that irritating academic debate about what, really, is democracy. As Fareed Zakaria and others have pointed out, there is a major difference between democracy as popular sovereignty, and democracy as constitutional limitations on the scope of government. The latter, "liberal" democracy, is what by and large characterizes the West. The former, "illiberal" democracy, too often gets mistaken for complete democracy. 

The election protesters in Tehran are rightly being hailed for their courage: Iran's illustrious history has been tarnished by repression. But what is it we in the West expect to come out of the protests? Popular sovereignty expressed through mass assembly can often be the enemy of liberal democracy (see Revolution, French or Africa, twentieth century). Let's say, in the end, Moussavi ends up assuming office: do we really believe this will cease all friction between Iran and the West? The Iranian public, if polls can be trusted, largely supports the nuclear program as an expression of prideful nationalism. And it's far from clear how the balance of power among the clerics, military, and "other" politicians stands, or how it is shifting.

There is little doubt that Ahmadinejad has been disastrous for the Iranian economy: per capita income is around $12,000, but this largely reflects oil and gas revenue, and most observers agree that it is unsustainable and unaccompanied by actual economic development. (The separate debate about the relationship between level of income and democracy sort of falters in cases like this.) But it's not clear that the necessary economic reforms will inexorably follow from the fissures of freedom now appearing.

In any case, we should cheer any challenge to oppressive authority. But let's not assume, or pretend, that this represents any sort of triumph (yet) of social media, of democracy, or economic development.

Comments

[Derek Ozkal]

well put. any attack against oppression is commendable, but doesn't necessarily mean the new system will be better.
the revolution may not be televised, but will be twitterized? bad joke?

[Jacob Mays]

I think it's inaccurate to view Iranians' support for the nuclear program as an expression of "prideful nationalism." In reality, the nuclear program is a strategic imperative.

The United States has toppled two of Iran's neighbors in a matter of weeks. The fact that we are currently bogged down in them for years is small consolation to the former leaders, who are for the most part now dead or imprisoned. Israel has nuclear weapons, and is not afraid to use its military superiority. No nation, least of all Iran, can afford to rely on American and Israeli forbearance.

This distinction is important because the nuclear program is then not subject to public opinion, but instead the rational decision of any Iranian leader (including Moussavi).

[Dane Stangler]

Jacob: Good point. I should have been more nuanced in my characterization. But you're making the same point from a different angle: even if the protesters succeed, even if Moussavi takes office, the nuclear program is highly unlikely to end. That's the point. If we look only at geopolitics and Iran's nuclear program, Twitter matters zero. I also find it hard to believe that the Obama Administration will forgive Iran's nuclear program as a matter of rational strategic action. Lots of things are rational; that doesn't mean they're good.

[Charles C. Johnson]

It seems to me that this is a good thing, even if the challenger loses for the following reasons.

1) It connects Iranians and Americans without the need of the government. When people talk to one another or have links they are probably less likely to want to go to war.

2) It might expose more sizeable fissures between the so-called reformers and the hardliners. This might allow us to discover new leverage against whatever regime ends up settling.

3) It promotes connections between the Iranian expatriates and the Iranians. They can use the money that will be funneled to them to continue agitating. The Twitter revolution has empowered a lot of people to think that they might just help affect regime change.

[Jacob Mays]

Dane: While Spock might disagree with your last point, I am with you. However, even if they don't forgive, it does have important implications for the Administration's reaction to the protesters. If the nuclear program is off the table, the protesters in Iran are no different from those in Moldova. In which case, where was the outcry two months ago?

This is moving increasingly far from the actual topic of the post, which I agree with.

[Jacob Mays]

Charles: I'll accept that it's a net positive, but I think Twitter is not so vitally important that it deserves to be called the Twitter Revolution (a title that was already used in Moldova anyway, until it turned out to not be the case). At the very least, it seems unlikely that messages posted to a public forum (available to the government) could be used to organize a protest.

It might be better to view Twitter as just an incremental step in the course of technology use in protests. Various forms have been attributed to protests in Poland (copy machines), Yugoslavia (radio), Belarus (LiveJournal), and Moldova (Twitter), and I would imagine that people are texting everybody in their phone any time there's a protest. If there's a benefit to Twitter, it is in an individual Iranian knowing that she is not alone in her opposition; there is real power in this. Twitter might make things slightly easier, but it's nothing radically different.

More directly to your points, I doubt that 140-character tweets are what's going to foster community between Americans and Iranians or bring to light policy disputes, and I think Iranian expatriates would be committed to what's going on in Iran without Twitter. Especially since, as far as I know, Twitter doesn't support Farsi.

[Michael Turner]

Petty of me to quibble when there's so much here to agree with, but citing a (presumably, average) per capita income of "around $12,000" isn't quite fair, when applied to a nation where the median age is 27, where the average urban household size is around 4.5 persons, and where income distribution is somewhat flatter than in the West. That might translate to a reasonably comfortable existence for most.

[louis vuitton]

The comments seem to be talking all around the question but not addressing the heart of the entreprenurial debate. The issue should be: How to get state capital around the financial logjam and into the hands of the entrepreneur.

[replica watches]

I hope that world poverty is eradicated completely. Is it ok to accept that in the future only only 1 billion people will be in poverty? should we be happy with that? sounds like 1 Billion people too many if you ask me!